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In The S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12310

OGDEN CITY, a Body Corporate and Politic
under the Laws of the State of Utah,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought
by plaintiffs to determine the validity of certain
taxing ordinances adopted by defendant in violation of the express terms of the franchise agreements previously entered into by defendant with
plaintiffs.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon a stipulation of facts and written memorandums filed with the court without oral argument,
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the court below entered judgment according to
plaintiffs no cause for action, the plaintiffs' complaint
was dismissed, and the following conclusions of
law were made by the court:
1. The franchises that were granted by
the defendant Ogden City to the plaintiffs, and
are the subject of this action are not valid
for the purpose of predetermining the tax
liability of the plaintiffs or the subscribers of
the plaintiffs, and the provisions of said franchises which purport to do so are ultra vires
acts, and those sections are void. The defendant's Ordinance No. 10-69, the additional
Utility Revenue Tax is valid as applied to the
plaintiffs.

2. The defendant has made a reasonable
classification in its ordinance number 10-69
in that defendant has selected from within
the class of public utilities a sub-class which
is defineable and distinguishable from other
sub-classes.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment below
on the grounds that such judgment is based upon
erroneous conclusions of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is made in reliance on the stipulation of facts between the parties
indexed in the Record as document number 4.
1.

Plaintiff, The Mountain States Telephone
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and Telegraph Company, a Colorado corporation,
is qualified to do business in the State of Utah, and
operates a telephone system in Ogden City, Utah
and elsewhere.
2. Plaintiff, Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
a Utah corporation, operates a gas supply system
in Ogden City, Utah and elsewhere.
3. Plaintiff, Utah Power & Light Company, a
Maine corporation, is qualified to do business in
the State of Utah and operates an electrical power
system in Ogden City, Utah and elsewhere.
4. Defendant, Ogden City, is a body Corporate
and Politic organized under the laws of the State
of Utah.
5. Defendant by ordinance granted franchises
to plaintiffs which provided that plaintiffs were to
pay to defendant 2% of the utility gross revenue
derived from sales within Ogden. Each franchise con-

tained provisions setting forth the defendant's agreement that
such payments were "in lieu" of all other taxes, charges and
impositions upon the revenue of .the plaintiffs. Copies of de-

fendant's ordinances, Ordinance 817 of 1964, which
sets forth the Franchise Agreement with The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company;
Ordinance 12-68 which sets forth the Franchise
Agreement with Mountain Fuel Supply Company;
and Ordinance 377 of 1951, which sets forth the
Franchise Agreement with Utah Power & Light Company may be found in the Record attached to plaintiffs' Complaint as Exhibits A, B, and C respectively.
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Plaintiffs' Complaint is indexed in the Record as
document number 1.

6. On August 1, 1968, defendant passed emerg.
ency Ordinance 18-68 adding a new Chapter 24 to
Title 7 of the Revised Ordinances of Ogden City,
1964, which imposed an additional two percentum
tax against each of plaintiffs' utility gross revenue. A
copy of said Ordinance may be found as Exhibit D
to plaintiffs' Complaint which is indexed in the
Record as document number 1. The tax imposed
thereby is hereinafter referred to as the "Additional
Utility Revenue Tax."
7. The Additional Utility Revenue Tax was
extended by defendant on July 3, 1969, by Ordinance 10-69 until August 31, 1970. Such ordinance
added a new Chapter 25 to Title 7 of the Revised
Ordinances of Ogden City, 1964. A copy of such
Ordinance may be found attached as Exhibit E to
the stipulation of facts between the parties which
is indexed in the Record as document number 4.
Ogden City, Utah, Revised Ordinances § 7-25-1
(1964) was amended on July 16, 1970 by Ordinance
23-70 to extend the Additional Utility Revenue Tax
until August 31, 1971.
8. The Additional Utility Revenue Tax has
only been imposed by the defendant upon the
plaintiffs and upon no other taxpayers.

9. Prior to February 15, 1970, each of the plaintiffs paid under protest the last quarterly payments
for 1969 of the Additional Utility Revenue Tax. (All
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subsequent quarterly payments have likewise been
paid under protest).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE "IN LIEU" PROVISIONS IN THE FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFFS ARE VALID, AND DEFENDANT'S ORDINANCES IMPOSING THE ADDITIONAL UTILITY REVENUE TAX ARE INVALID AS AN IMPAIRMENT OF
SUCH FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS.

1. Controlling Law

Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:
No state Shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . .

Similarly, Section 18 of Article I of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part:
No . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.

Defendant's ordinances imposing the Additional Utility Revenue Tax, which by the terms of such
ordinances is a license tax, are in direct violation
and impairment of express provisions in defendant's franchise agreements with plaintiffs. The
franchise of Utah Power & Light Company contains
the following provision:
"As a further consideration for this
franchise and in lieu of all municipal occupa-
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tion or license taxes upon the Company, its
property or business within the City, the
Company agrees to pay a sum equal to two
percentum (2%) on the gross revenue derived by the Company from the sale and use of
electrical power and energy within the corporate limits of the city." Ogden City, Utah,
Ordinance 377 of 1951, March 14, 1951 (emphasis added) .

The franchise of Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company contains this language:
"In consideration of the payments hereinabove provided for, it is ex.pressly understood
and agreed by the City and the Company that
the payments so provided in Section 5 hereof
[2.0% of the Company's gross revenue received from Ogden City's inhabitants] shall
be in lieu of any and all other franchise,
license, privilege, occupation, or any other form
of excise tax (except general ad valorem property taxes, sales taxes and special assessment
for local improvements), based upon or measured by the rev.enue, employees, payroll, property, poles, wires, instruments, conduits, pipes,
fixtures or other appurtenances of the Company, and all other property or equipment of
the Company or any part thereof. . . . " Ogden
City, Utah, Ordinance 817 of 1964, October
8, 1964 (emphasis added).

Similarly, the franchise of Mountain Fuel Supply Company states:
"In consideration of the grantee's making
the payments hereinabove provided for in the
next preceding section, it is expressly under-
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stood and agreed/by the City and the
that the sum equivalent to two per cent (2%)
of the gross receipts as above provided shall
be in lieu of any and all other franchise, occupation, privilege, license, excise, revenue, or
similar .taxes and all other exactions (except
ad valorem property taxes and special assessments for local improvements) upon the revenue, property, gas mains, gas supply and
distribution pipe, equipment, fixtures, or other
appurtenances of said grantee, and all other
property or equipment of said grantee, or any
part thereof." Ogden City, Utah, Ordinance
12-68, July 11, 1968 (emphasis added).

In every instance where municipalities have
challenged the validity of "in lieu" provisions in
franchise agreements with public utilities which fix
the level of taxation to be imposed against the public utilities, courts have upheld such provisions and
have invalidated any attempts on the part of municipalities to subsequently impose taxes in excess
of such level as a breach or impairment of contract.
In the very recent case of City of North Las Vegas
v. Central Telephone Co., 85 Nev. 620, 460 P.2d 835 (1969),
Central Telephone Co. provided telephone service
to the inhabitants of the city of North Las Vegas under a 50-year franchise granted to its predecessor by
an ordinance adopted by said city in 1958. Said
ordinance provided that the telephone company
should pay to the city one per cent of its gross revenue from specified charges, and that such pay-
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ments should be "in lieu of the charges made for license
fee under City of North Las Vegas Ordinance." 460 P.2d at
835 (emphasis added). In 1968, said city adopted an
ordinance imposing a license tax against public
utilities of five per cent of essentially the same revenues specified in the previous franchise ordinance.
In a declaratory judgment action commenced by
the telephone company, the lower court, and on
appeal the Nevada Supreme Court, held the 1968
ordinance void against the telephone company by
reason of federal and state constitutional prohibitions against passing a law "impairing the obligation of contracts."
Another case where an "'in lieu" provision,
similar to the ones in v o 1 v e d in plaintiffs'
franchise agreements with defendant, was enforced
is City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 76 Mich. 421, 43
N.W. 447 (1889). In that case a street railway company was granted a franchise to construct its railway on the streets of the City of Detroit. By ordinance enacted and accepted, it was agreed between
the city and railway company that the latter should
pay certain percentages of its gross revenue to the
city and other payments which, during the life of
the franchise, were to be "in lieu of all taxes, license
fees, and charges on the property, stock, rights, and franchise
of the [railway company] under present or future laws or
authority." 43 N.W. at 447 (emphasis added).

In breach of such agreement, the City of Detroit
thereafter assesed taxes against the railway com-
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pany in additirn to the agreed payments. The railway company refused to pay the additional taxes
and the city brought an action against it to collect
the taxes. Upholding the contract, the court held in
favor of the railway company.
The validity of the "in lieu" provision which
was challenged in the City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry.
case was challenged again in subsequent litigation
as being "ultra vires'' but was again upheld by the
Michigan Supreme Court as a binding limitation on
the taxing power of the City of Detroit. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 125
Mich. 673, 85 N.W. 96 (1901).
The in point holdings in the above cases are
supported by numerous cases from other jurisdictions. See, generally, Annot., Tax Exemptions and the
Contract Clause, 173 A.LR. 15 (1948). Among the judicial
opinions supporting such holdings are opinions
written by the United States Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit at a time when
Utah was part of said circuit, and by the Utah Supreme Court. City of S.t. Louis v. United Ry., 210 .U. S.
266 (1908); City and County of Denver v. Stenger, 295 F.
809 (8th Cir. 1924); Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Ry.,
45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 (1914).
The City of St. Louis v. United Ry. case involved
the issue of whether or not, because the city of St.
Louis had required and the United Railways Company and other companies had agreed, pursuant to
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franchise agreements, to pay certain fixed sums for
the use of the streets, that the said city had thereby
deprived itself of the power to thereafter charge a
license fee or tax. There were no express provisions
in the franchise ordinances there in question relinquishing such power. Holding that the said city
had not relinquished such power, Mr. Justice Day,
speaking for the court, stated:
An examination of the cases in this court
shows that it is not sufficient that a street
railway company has agreed to pay for the
privilege of using the streets for a given term,
either in a lump sum, or by payments in installments, or percentages of the receipts, to thereby conclude the municipality from exercising
a statutory authority to impose license fees or
taxes. This right still exists unless there is a
distinct agreement, clearly expressed, that the
sums to be paid are in lieu of all such exactions.
210 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added).

The question of whether a city can exact taxes
from a company in addition to the exactions received pursuant to a franchise agreement was also
dealt with in the case of Salt Lake City v. Utah Light
& Ry., supra. The litigation arose as a result of an
ordinance that Salt Lake City enacted which provided that it would be unlawful to engage in the business of selling electricity and using a meter to
measure the same without first obtaining a license
costing $1.00 for each meter used. Prior to the enactment of such ordinance, Utah Light & Railway
Company had been granted a 50-year franchise.
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The case was tried on a stipulation of facts. Noting that there was no express provision in the franchise whereby Salt Lake City surrendered its right
to impose a license or occupation tax upon the power company, the Court held that it was not improper
for Salt Lake City to impose the license tax. After
quoting the above quoted language from the opinion in City of St. Louis v. United Ry., supra, and other
excerpts from such opinion and after noting certain
other cases, the court stated:
It is true that in those cases it is held that
where a city enters into a contract with either
a natural or artificial person whereby such city
exacts a rental or other charge for the right to
erect poles or other instrumentalities in the
streets and public places of such city for the
purpose of permitting such person to carry on
or conduct a certain business or calling in said
city in which such person deals with such
city and with its inhabitans, or with either or
both, such city may not, after entering into
the contract, impose new duties or burdens,
or exact additional compensation, for the doing of the things specified in the contract. It
is also held in at least some of those cases
that a municipal corporation, as an arm of
the state government, for a consideration received by it, may barter away or surrender
the right to impose certain taxes, but, in order
to accomplish that result, the right must be
surrendered or bartered in express terms.
The right to impose taxes being one of necessity,
and being a prerogative of the sovereign power,
is never taken away by implication or by mere
construction, but, in order to be binding upon
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the sovereignty, must be surrendered in express
terms . ... There is absolutely nothing in either
of the franchises or the ordinances ref erred to
in the stipulation of facts, and under which appellant claims, whereby Salt Lake City has in any
way or to any extent bound itself not to impose
any and all taxes that are authorized by our Constitution or statutes. 45 Utah at 55-56, 142 P. at
1069 (emphasis added).

In contrast, the Ogden City ordinances granting the plaintiffs their franchises are so strong and
clear in stating that the franchise payments are "in
lieu" of other exactons, that each clearly satisfies
the test laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in City of St. Louis v. United Ry., supra, and by the
Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City v. Utah Light
& Ry .., supra. The relevant part of the Federal and
State Constitutions and State statutes are substantially the same now as when such cases were decided.
In City and County of Denver v. Stenger, supra, Denver Tramway Company had accepted a franchise
from the City and County of Denver in 1906 which
provided in part:
As a further consideration for this franchise and grant and in lieu of any car licenses
now or hereafter during the life of this franchise and grant, assessed, charged or collected
by the city and county of Denver, the Denver
City Tramway Company shall pay to the city
and county of Denver the sum of twelve hundred thousand dollars ( $1,200,000.00), payable in equal installments of five thousand
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dollars ($5,000) each on the first day of each
and every calendar month during the life of
this franchise. 295 F. at 812.

The tramway company made the payments
called for by such franchise until 1920 when a receiver was appointed to conduct the business of
the company. The central issue before the court was
whether or not Denver's claim to the payments under the franchise agreement was entitled to preference to the claims of general creditors. Before dealing with such issue the court found it necessary to
deal with the validity of the franchise agreement.
In this respect, the court stated:
Appellant [City and County of Denver]
might, by contract, both grant the right to special privileges in its streets and also deprive
itself of the right to tax the exercise thereof.
[Citing City of St. Louis v. United Ry., supra].
It did both expressly in the franchise of 1906.
295 F. at 814 and 815.

2.

Defendant's Contentions and Lower Court's
Conclusions of Law.

Defendant's contention in its Answer that plaintiffs "are merely collection agents and are not the
taxpayers" and an intimation in the lower court's conclusions of law to the same effect are clearly erroneous and merit no further reply other than to point
out the following plain language of the Additional
Utility Revenue Tax:
"There is hereby levied upon the business
of every person or company engaged in the

14
business in Ogden City, Utah, of supplying
telephone, gas or electric energy service as
public utilities, an annual license tax equal
to two per centum of the gross revenue derived
from the sale and use of the services of said
utilities within the corporate limits of Ogden
City." Ogden City, Utah, Rev. Ordinances
§ 7-24-1 (as enacted by Ogden City, Utah,
Ordinance 18-68, August 1, 1968); Ogden City,
Utah, Rev. Ordinances § 7-25-1 (as enacted
by Ogden City, Utah, Ordinance 10-69, July
3, 1969 and as amended by Ogden City, Utah,
Ordinance 23-70, July 16, 1970).

The defendant makes a number of other contentions in its Answer which may be reduced to essentially an assertion that defendant's power of taxation is a governmental funct1on which may not be
limited or restricted by one city council by being
made the subject of a contract binding on future
city councils.
It is surprising that such contention is advanced
by defendant in view of the fact that the Additional
Utility Revenue Tax was first enacted by the same
City Council of defendant that less than one month
previous to such enactment had entered into the
franchise agreement with Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, as can be seen by comparing the date
of the first ordinance enacting such tax with the
date of the ordinance comprising such franchise
agreement. Ogden City, Utah, Ordinance 12-68, July
11, 1968 (franchise agreement with Mountain Fuel
Supply Company); Ogden City, Utah, Ordinance 1868, August 1, 1968 (Additional Utility Revenue Tax).
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Furthermore, defendant and the lower court in
apparently adopting such contention have failed to
point to a single constitutional or statutory provision
which would so limit the duly elected representatives of the people of Ogden in their power to contract with plaintiffs. Indeed, it is clear that defendant's power is not so limited and that such assertion by defendant is in direct contradiction to the
cases discussed above and is contrary to an overwhelming weight of authority which includes cases
dating as far back as 1812. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 164 (1812 opinion by Marshall, Ch.J.).
See footnote 5 on page 25 of Annot., Tax Exemptions
and the Contract Clause, supra, for cases from over 30
Jurisdictions refuting defendant's contention. Such
cases stand for the proposition that a legislative
body may not only restrict or limit its power of taxation by contract in respect to particular taxpayers
but also may grant exemptions therefrom by contract. As stated by the court in City of St. Louis v. United
Ry., supra at 273 and 27 4:
. . . [I] t can be no longer doubted that a
State or municipal corporation, acting under
its authority, may deprive itself by contract
of the power to exercise a right conferred by
law to collect taxes or license fees ....

Section 10-8-80 of Utah Code Annotated (1962)
Provides in respect to municipalities:
They may raise revenue by levying and
collecting a license fee or tax on any business
within the limits of the city, and regulate the
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same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah
city or town shall collect a license fee or tax
hereunder from any solicitor or salesman who
solicits, obtains orders for or sells goods in
such city or town solely for resale; and no
enumeration of powers of cities contained in
this chapter, shall be deemed to limit or restrict
the general grant of authority hereby conferred.
All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform
in respect to the class upon which they are
imposed.

The last sentence of Section 10-8-80 necessarily implies the power in municipalities to classify businesses for purposes of taxation, and the power to impose a tax on one class of businesses necessarily
implies the power to exempt all other businesses
from such tax. See Lockhart v. American Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 194 S.W.2d 285, at 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
Furthermore, with the exception of property
taxes in respect to which the law often requires, by
virtue of constitutional or statutory provisions or
case law, uniform taxation according to value, a
grant by a state legislature to a municipality of the
power to tax ordinarily carries with it a corresponding power to make reasonable exemptions from taxation. Betts v. Zeller, 263 A.2d 290 (Del. 1970) (income
tax). As was stated by one court:
And where the Legislature has granted
the power to a municipality to levy license
taxes, the discretion of the city is as far
reaching as when the power is directly exercised by the Legislature itself. Kroger Grocery
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& Baking Co. v. City of Lancaster, 276 Ky.

585, 124 S.W.2d 745, at 751 (1938).

However, the full measure of defendant's exemption power wa.s not availed of in this case since
the "in lieu" provisions in plaintiffs' franchise agreements with defendant cannot properly be viewed as
exemptions from taxation. Such provisions are in
reality a method of taxation rather than an exemption therefrom and represent agreements whereby
the defendant agrees not to attempt other approaches to glean additional revenues from plaintiffs. See American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Colorado,
204 U.S. 103 (1907); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. City
of Ashbury Park, 128 N.J.L. 141, 24 A.2d 526 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd per curiam 129 N.J.L. 253, 29 A.2d 139 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942).
As a further indicator of the invalidity of defendant's argument and the lower court's conclusion of law that defendant did not have the power
to agree to the "in lieu" provisions in the franchise
agreements between plaintiffs and defendant, it
should be pointed out that the ultimate power over
whether or not a public utility can operate within a
municipality, and consequently the ultimate power
over the terms and conditions under which a franchise is granted to such public utility, has been
placed in such municipality under Section 8 of
Article XII of the Utah Constitution which provides
as follows:
No law shall be passed granting the right
to construct and operate a street railroad,
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telegraph, telephone or electric light plant
within any city or incorporated town, without
the consent of the local authorities who have
control of the street or highway proposed to
be occupied for such purposes.

Defendant's power to contract with plaintiffs
and thereby limit its taxation of plaintiffs is further
buttressed by Section 10-8-14 of Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1969) which provides as follows in dealing with the power of municipalities:
They may construct, maintain and operate
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment
systems, gas works, electric light works, telephone lines or public transportation systems,
or authorize the construction, maintenance and
operation of the same by others, or purchase
or lease such works or systems from any person or corporation, and they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of
any such works, not required by the city or its
inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the
city.

The power resting in defendant by virtue of
such constitutional and statutory provisions to grant
franchise rights to public utilities is similar to if not
greater than the power which the City of Detroit
had in respect to railway companies under a corresponding Michigan statutory provision set forth
in City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., supra, and Detroit
Citizens' St. Ry. v. Common Council of City of Detroit, supra.

Such corresponding provision, section 34 of the organic act under which the railway company and its
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successor involved in those cases were organized,
provided that a company organized under such organic act could not construct a railway in any
street" ... without the consent of the municipal
authorities of such town or city, and under
such regulations, and upon such terms and conditions, as said authorities may from time to
time prescribe: provided, further, that after
such consent shall have been given, and accepted by the company or corporation to which
the same is granted, such authorities shall
make no regulations or conditions whereby the
rights or franchises so granted shall be destroyed or unreasonably impaired, or such
company or corporation be deprived of the
right of constructing, maintaining, and operating such railway in the street in such consent
or grant named, pursuant to the terms thereof." 43 N.W. at 447; 85 N.W. at 106.

In spite of the fact that such provision made no
specific mention of municipal taxation of railway
companies organized under such organic act, the
Michigan Supreme Court stated in its opinion in
Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. v. Common Council of City of Detroit, supra at 106 (emphasis added):
The organic act under which this street railway was organized compelled the defendant to
submit to such terms in regard to local taxation
as it should be able to make with the city.
See City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., supra.
And every other street railway was obliged to
do the same. This was a general law, but it left
the city to impose or omit a special tax in each
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particular case as it should see fit. That may
or may not have been wise. It is not a question
of wisdom, but of power. When the city saw fit
to make its easements and local taxes the subject of contract, the agreement bound both
parties, and there is no reason for requiring the
private corporation to live up to every provision
of the contract, and permitting .the municipal
corporation to disregard it at will. Such contract
was made, and is as binding as though made by
the legislature itself . . . . That, in the absence
of constitutional prohibition, the legislature, has
unlimited power, does not admit of doubt . ...
The respondent must be content to measure its
city taxes by the terms of its contract.

When a municipality is granted the power to
contract with public utilities, such as plaintiffs, to
provide utility services instead of providing such
services itself (which it could do by enlisting its tax·
ing power), it makes sense in terms of policy and
reason as well as being dictated by the authority of
the Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. case that such power includes the power to limit its taxation of such utilities
by the same contract. It is, no doubt, only because
the services provided by public utilities to a municipality's citizens are in the nature of public serv·
ices and are essential to the public welfare that
municipalites are allowed to either contract for such
services or provide the services themselves. Indeed,
even the power of eminent domain may be enlisted
to provide such services because the use of prop·
erty to provide such services is considered a "public
use." Utah Code Ann.§ 78-34-1 (1953).
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In view of the vital and public nature of the
services provided by public utilities, it surely could
not be the intent of Utah Const. art XII, § 8 and Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969), quoted above, that
the power of municipalities to contract with public
utilities should be limited by the artificial rule
argued for by defendant, and apparently adopted
by the court below, that the power of taxation may
not be made the subject of contract by one city
council binding on future councils.
The arguments in favor of such a rule have been
frequently advanced in respect to not only municipalities but also other legislative bodies as well.
However, as stated on pages 32 and 33 of Annot.,

Tax Exemptions and the Contract Clause, supra:

Although the force of these arguments has
frequently been admitted, . . . the doctrine
[that a contract of tax exemption can constitute a contract protected by the United States
Constitution] has withstood all the assaults
made upon it for over a century, and remains
firmly established as the law of the United
States. The courts have repeatedly stated that
the matter is settled, that the question is not
an open one, and that the Federal Supreme
Court, the final arbiter of constitutional questions such as one as to whether there is a contract and whether it has been impaired, has
foreclosed speculation.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ORDINANCES IMPOSING THE
ADDITIONAL UTILITY REVENUE TAX ARE IN-
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VALID IN THAT THEY ARE DISCRIMINATORY
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS.

As previously discussed, defendant has the
power to classify taxpayers taxing some classes and
not others. However, classifications made pursuant
to that power must be reasonable and not discriminatory. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, Utah Const.
art. I, § 24; Utah Code Ann., § 10-8-80 (1962); Salt Lake

City v. Utah Light & Ry., supra.

"Classification" is grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars and differ from other
things in the same particulars. See, generally, 7
Words and Phrases 568 (1952); Black's Law Dictionary 316 (4th ed. 1957).
The "class" upon which the Additional Utility
Revenue Tax is imposed is "every person or company engaged in the business in Ogden City, Utah,
of supplying telephone, gas or electric energy
service as public utilities." Ogden City, Utah, Rev.
Ordinances § 7-24-1 (as enacted by Ogden City,
Utah, Ordinance 18-68, August 1, 1968); Ogden City,
Utah, Rev. Ordinances § 7-25-1 (as enacted by Ogden City, Utah, Ordinance 10-69, July 3, 1969 and as
amended by Ogden City, Utah, Ordinance 23-70,
July 16, 1970). The businesses of plaintiffs are the
only businesses considered part of such "class" by
defendant. R. document number 4.
The question may then be asked in what par·
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ticular or particulars do the businesses of plaintiffs
agree with one another and differ from other businesses in the same particulars. Plaintiffs contend the
only similarity between those in the "class" is that
such businesses are public utilities. However, if the
unifying and distinguishing particular upon which
the class is based is that members of the class are
public utilities, then the ordinances imposing the
Additional Utility Revenue Tax are clearly discriminatory because there are businesses other than
those of plaintiffs being conducted in Ogden City,
Utah, which also agree in that particular (are public
utilities) but which are not subject to the tax, such
as trucking and transportation companies who operate as franchised public utilities within the city.
Defendant and the court below have failed to
state any particular or particulars whatsoever which
the businesses of plaintiffs have in common as a
class or as a "sub-class" distinguishing them from
all other businesses, including other public utilities,
and which gives a rational basis for singling the
businesses of plaintiffs out as a group for taxation.
Thus, plaintiffs maintain that defendant has not engaged in permissible classification but rather has engaged in prohibited discrimination by apparently
choosing public utilities as a class for taxation and
then arbitrarily taxing some public utilities and not
others in direct violation of the express requirement of Section 10-8-80 of Utah Code Annotated
0 962) which states that "license fees and taxes shall
be uniform in respect to the class upon which they
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are imposed" and in violation of U.S. Const. amend.
XIV,§ 1 and Utah Const. art. I,§ 24.
CONCLUSION
At the time their franchise agreements with the
defendant were negotiated, each of the plaintiffs
agreed to pay 2% of their gross revenue, a figure
substantially higher than any of them had been
paying before, for their franchise rights upon the
understanding and agreement with the defendant
that such payments would be in lieu of all other
occupation or license tax impositions by the defendant against plaintiffs. Such understanding and
agreement was valid and binding according to the
pronouncements of the highest judicial tribunal of
each jurisdiction in which defendant was located.
By obtaining plaintiffs' agreement to such franchises
defendant secured the plaintiffs' performance of
services essential to the public good, has received
the benefit of heavy investment by plaintiffs since
then in improving and extending such services, and
has regularly received the agreed 2% of plaintiffs'
gross revenue. Defendant now wishes to breach its
agreement by imposing a license tax in addition to
the agreed franchise amount.
Reason and a vast body of authority dictate that
defendant may not so breach its contract, and the
lower court's judgment to the contrary is therefore
unwarranted. Furthermore, to limit by judicial decision a legislative body's sovereign power to contract as the lower court has done when there are
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no constitutional or statutory provisions upon which
to base such limitation is in conflict with a basic
principle of our society that legislative bodies duly
elected by the people are the best judges of what
is in the public interest. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853 opinion by Taney,
C.J.)
Finally, plaintiffs submit that in order for confidence to be maintained in our ever expanding system of government, such government must be held
to an elevated morality and must not be allowed to
consider itself exempt from the same rules of honesty and fair dealing which are enforced between
individuals and private corporations. This is the
policy and protection underlying the impairment
of contract clauses of the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Utah, and such policy should
be enforced in this case by reversing the judgment
of the District Court of Weber County and granting
the plaintiffs the relief prayed for in their Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
David E. Salisbury
Alan F. Mecham
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
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